Climate Policy and Green Economy Journal

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Research on Collaborative Governance Strategies for Air Pollution Based on Differential Game Theory

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https://doi.org/10.54963/cpgej.v1i1.2406
Shi, F., Zhou, Z., Hu, M., Huang, Z., & Cheng, Z. (2025). Research on Collaborative Governance Strategies for Air Pollution Based on Differential Game Theory. Climate Policy and Green Economy Journal, 1(1), 38–52. https://doi.org/10.54963/cpgej.v1i1.2406
Volume 1 Issue 1 (2025)
Copyright (c) 2025 Fulei Shi, Zisha Zhou, Moyang Hu, Zhihan Huang, Zixuan Cheng
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Authors

  • Fulei Shi

    School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China
  • Zisha Zhou

    School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China
  • Moyang Hu

    School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China
  • Zhihan Huang

    School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China
  • Zixuan Cheng

    School of Statistics and Data Science, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China

Received: 28 April 2025; Revised: 3 June 2025; Accepted: 8 July 2025; Published: 13 August 2025

In recent years, air pollution has become an increasingly important issue along with economic and industrial development. To study the interaction between government and enterprises in pollution control, we have developed a differential game model and analyzed their dynamic decision-making process under different governance situations. Three scenarios are considered, including a Nash non-cooperative game, a Stackelberg game led by the government, and a cooperative game with subsidies. The results show that under both the Nash and Stackelberg games, the strategies of government regulation and enterprise emission reduction are completely identical, and the pollution stock remains at a relatively high level. In these two situations, enterprises tend to stay in a passive emission reduction state, so the improvement in pollution governance is limited. However, under the cooperative game, the government encourages enterprises by providing subsidies for emission reduction. As a result, enterprises are more willing to increase their abatement efforts, while the government can reduce part of its regulatory pressure at the same time. Compared with the other two scenarios, the pollution stock decreases more significantly in the cooperative case. These findings indicate that subsidy policies can improve cooperation between government and enterprises and help achieve better environmental governance. And this study may provide some references for the design of air pollution control policies.

Keywords:

Pollution Abatement Game Theory Differential Game Environmental Regulation

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