In recent years, air pollution has become an increasingly important issue along with economic and industrial development. To study the interaction between government and enterprises in pollution control, we have developed a differential game model and analyzed their dynamic decision-making process under different governance situations. Three scenarios are considered, including a Nash non-cooperative game, a Stackelberg game led by the government, and a cooperative game with subsidies. The results show that under both the Nash and Stackelberg games, the strategies of government regulation and enterprise emission reduction are completely identical, and the pollution stock remains at a relatively high level. In these two situations, enterprises tend to stay in a passive emission reduction state, so the improvement in pollution governance is limited. However, under the cooperative game, the government encourages enterprises by providing subsidies for emission reduction. As a result, enterprises are more willing to increase their abatement efforts, while the government can reduce part of its regulatory pressure at the same time. Compared with the other two scenarios, the pollution stock decreases more significantly in the cooperative case. These findings indicate that subsidy policies can improve cooperation between government and enterprises and help achieve better environmental governance. And this study may provide some references for the design of air pollution control policies.